What mayc ount as a "secular" organization, or a "secular" movement?H ow should secular societies be studied, classified, and compared?The amount of research into group manifestations of secular energy and activism has been limited and disjointed, most likelyd ue to ag eneral lack of clarity and rigor.
and sensitivities to secularity'so wn histories and agendas. The reality of "polysecularity," as Iterm it,awaits exploration at the individual level. Polysecularity, in brief, refers to the broad diversity to secularitydisplayedbypeople throughout their mundane lives. Secular people needn'tbedefined in terms of deviancy any more. Some secular people are secularists offering resistancetoreligion, by participating in the advancement of secularism'sa ffirmativea gendas. The diversity and positivity inherent to secularist attitudes and activist agendas is here labeled as "polysecularism."
This chapter concludes by situating secular organizations in America within this polysecularity-polysecularism framework. The framework'sc lassification of ideological niches situates wherevarious typesofsecular organizations can find their corresponding sorts of supporters.The phenomena of polysecularity at the individual level is accompanied at the social level by the polysecularism of organizational diversity observedi nt he United States.T his framework accounts for the kinds of disagreements, and even inevitable antagonisms, among secular organizations.
2S ituatingS ecularity
Researchinto secularitytoo often proceeds as though being secular or not being abeliever is predicable upon some basic, static, and singular construct.Theology helpfullycleared the wayfor that procedure. With onlyone path up the mountain to the sacred, there is onlyone path down. Secularization is just de-sacralization; secular people descendingt ot he mountain'sb ase are secular onlyf or having taken the path in the wrongd irection. However,s cholarlyr esearch into the pluralism of religions exposes difficulties for objectivelyd efining religion or faith. Whym ust research into the secular wait upon anyf ragile consensus about which mountain is "religion" or which meaning to the "religious" is best?N or eligion'st heologyc ould servea sagood guide for this rough terrain.
How about history?Historians have been heard proclaiming that irreligion is but amodernist creation, emerging about the time when "religion" as aconcept was invented. If "religion" is as artificiallyc onstructed as some historians of modernity think (consultNongbri 2012), wouldn'tde-centering modernist frameworks bring authentic and non-essentialized secularity back into view?Besides, atheists could not be as constructed to the samedegree as "religion" by modernity,s ince real unbelief could not be produced by an unreal religion. Hence, historians should not classify atheism as ar eligion'sm odern spinoff or sect.M edieval scholastics read about atheism from ancient Greeks (Shook 2015) , and atheists are visibled uringt he Renaissance (Wotton 1992) .
Either way, whethert heology'su nreliablem ap or history'sd ubious framings arefollowed, confused theorizing ratherthanmethodical observationendsupdictating whoisinhabitingsocieties.Thatsituation is notsustainable forascholarly fielda spiringt oa ny scientifics tatus. Empiricalr esearcha lreadyp oints towards immensequalitative andquantitative variancesinthe beliefs, values,motivations, andp sychological characteristics of individual nonbelievers.The people lacking belief in deities maybemorevariedthanall thosewho do believeinadeity. Studiesinto personal secularity areconfirmingthatpossibility;recentresearchhas accumulatedi mpressive results ( Despite what religion'stheologians or modernity'shistorians mayclaim, secularity is not reducible to af eature of secularism or ab y-product of secularization. Trying to reduce secularityt oa ny particular thing,m uch less something that exists onlyi nr elation to religion, is not provingt ob ee mpiricallyo re xplanatorilys atisfactory.S ecular people don'ts hare common routes departing from religion, they don'tm aintain similar attitudes about religion, and many have no attitude or opinion whatsoever about religion. Secular people don'ta dvancet he samep riorities for opposing religion, and they typicallyc an'ta gree about effectives trategies for countering religion. In fact,i ta ppears that more secular people are not thinking about religion thanthosewho are, and those secular people who happen to ponder religion hardlyconsider the matter in similar ways.I ti sn ot even the case that secularism is au niformlyd efinable issue, an adjunct or corollary to liberalism, or as ingular ideology ( Bilgrami 2014; Baker and Smith 2015; K itcher 2015) .
Despite these warningsf rom empirical studies, sociologya nd social history have been largely following ad ictum accuratelyp ronounced by Rajeev Bhargava: "It should be obvious thatthe 'secular' and the 'religious' are always and everywhere mutuallyc onstituted" (Bhargava2 011, 54).T his dictum is false, and Secular Studies must reject it.I ts role as ap latitude says more about religious scholarship thana nything secular.S ecular and religious scholars alike should be able to register empirical facts before imposingp aradigms.M ost evident to objective observation are the shifting culturalf orces contending for social authority over time in various countries.W hat constitutes religion, in the first place?
Religions are hardlythe solidlypermanent entities -the unmovedmoversthat their followers presume or expect. They are continuallyr eshaped and reformedb yc ritical attention, from within and without (Berger1 967). Religions sometimese ncounter such attention in the form of resistance, by those trying to modify the scope and degree of religious influencew ithin society.When disputes over religion escalate to the point wheres ome people are questioning its validity,l egitimacy,o ra uthority,t hese engagementse nter the arena of secularism. While sharp criticism of religion is not the same as intentionallyadvocating secularity, it can nevertheless have thatp ractical effect.N or eligion fails to notice. Questioning religion in public typicallye licits defensive reactions, concerned for repairing anydiminishment of religious conviction and public confidence in religion. That is whyp ublic criticism of religion easilya rouses theological surveillance and intervention, shoring up the reputation of religion with justificatory responses. What starts out as the civil questioning of religious involvement in society can easilytransition towards tendentious arguments over doctrines defendedbytheologyand disputed by dissenters.Civic dissenters may become defensive from accusations thatthey dangerouslydeviate from the "correct" religious worldview.The mere ability of another person to consider seriously aworldview that differsfrom one'sown is aclear epistemological threat to the religiouslystructuredway of life (Bergerand Luckmann 1966) . Those courageous enough to declare their doubts about coret heological creeds getc ast into the role of being ar eligious apostate, or perhaps even being an "atheist." Critics of religious controls over society and politics are then called "secularists" but classified practicallya sa theists too.
So far,t his account of religious-secular engagement can make Bhargava's platitudes eem sensible. An account of civic dissent,a st heologyw ould shape it,r evolvesa round unreasonable deviations from religious conviction and correctness.N evertheless, that is not how civic dissenters necessarilyd escribe their motivations.T he religious need not be "constituting" the secular,b ya ny means. Yes, public disputes are often draggedi nto theological arenas,b ut that hardlymeans that the inspiration to civic dissent is exclusively or even primarily about religion itself. Civil dissent with religion can easilyerupt over civic matters of concern to all society,n ot merelyc reedal issues of theological interest.T he wayt hatt heological defense mechanisms must regard civicd issent as unwelcome unorthodoxy is just ap artisan perspective.I ti sj ust one wayo ff raming the matter in away favorabletoreligion, much in the sameway that entrenched governing regimes can depict political dissidents as traitors motivated by unpatriotic ideology, in order to depict the government as trulyloyal to the nation.
The process by which civic dissent from religion and religious influences over society are usually framed as some sort of theological schism,o re vena chasm of apostasy,can make it appearthat dissenters cannot be understood unless and until am easure of their theological distance from the religious hegemonyismeasured. The genuine motivations and goals of civic dissent can be easily overlooked by such asingle-minded method, especiallythoseaspirations having nothing to do with religiosity,b ut instead with secular hopesa nd ideals. Those wanting the least do to with religiosity,d esiring to associate with similarlys ec-ular people in am ore secular society,a re hardly "unbelievers"-they have all sorts of secular motivations and civic goals. As far as religion can tell, however, they are just impiousunbelievers and nothing more,bereft of the "correct" convictions that ought to guide everyone. That negativity,f rom at heological perspective,i st heir onlyr eality.
Secular Studies researchers can remainbeholden to that dependent negativity,ins eemingly innocuous ways.Atrained inability to apprehend or conceptualize the secular in anyi ndependent manner onlyd ebilitates secular research, renderingi tvulnerable to religious paradigms.I nt wo recent works,e xemplary for theirs trugglesa gainst religion-inspired treatments of the nonreligious, we can read the following:
Yet "secularity" is not independent of "religion" at all but is rather onlym eaningful in relation to it.The idea of somethingbeingsecular is simplyunintelligible without an understandingofsomethingelse as religious and aview as to where the (moving) boundary between the twof alls. (Lee 2015,2 5) "Nonreligion" denotes phenomena that areg enerallyn ot considered religious but whose significancei sm oreo rl ess dependent on religion (atheists area no bvious example). (Quack 2014,4 39) With such mantras securelyi np lace, full recognitiono fa nything positive to religion'ss upposed "other" won'tb ep ossible. Allowing the meaning of the "secular" or the "nonreligious" to be controlled by religious thinking is onlya(moving) measure of religion'sh egemonyo vers cholarship. Distinguishing the "nonreligious" apart from the "secular" so that one of these terms might betterapply to matters more aloof from religion, all the while insisting thatb oth terms can onlyu ltimatelyb eu nderstood in relation to religion, onlyl eavest he subject more confused and unscientific (Jong2 015).A sf or atheists, they are indeedo f great significancet or eligion; appealing to them as exemplars of secularity would be expectedfrom thatsame religious hegemony, not independent secular scholarship.
Instead of waiting for religious thought to explain what "secular" must mean, Secular Studies could instead studys ocial and individual phenomena, noting those thatl ack religious features and whose significancei si ndependent from anything religious. Despite the mantrasn ow crowding religious studies, and toom uch of secular studies, ap erson can be quite secular regardless of whether that person'st houghts have ever ponderedr eligion or that person's dailyl ife ever contacts anything religious. To claim otherwise commits either the psychologist'sf allacy or the sociologist'sf allacy,e xplainedi nt he next section.
3S ecularI dentity
Identifying secular people is one thing;secular identityisanother.Aperson can be quite secular regardless of whether that person ponders secularity or encounters secularism. Being secular isn'te ssentiallya bout having as ecular identity, anym ore thanb eing secular is about having an onreligious identity.The question must be asked, who is reallycontrolling the assignment of identity?M ixing up social classificationsw ith personal identitiesw asn'ti nvented by theologyor sociology. Society itself prefers to deal with evidentstereotypes rather than subsurface identities, and politics finds it convenient to reduceself-identitytogroup categorization.
Social scientists can avoid reifying stereotypes. Anyr esearcher speakingo f " identity" should make clear which sort of identity is meant (Turner 2013, chap. 6) . Am anageable wayt od iscriminate typeso fi dentity can include:
Youa re an "X" if and onlyi fy ou should prefer others to regard youa sa n " X." [ideal identity] Youa re an "X" if and onlyi fy ou prefer others to regard youa sa n" X." [valued identity] Youa re an "X" if and onlyi fy ou openlya gree that youa re an "X." [admitted identity] Youa re an "X" if and onlyi fy ou sincerelyt hink of yourself as an "X." Forexample, the classificationof"atheist" is acategoricalidentity:solong as a person does not believei na ny god, that person is an atheist, regardless of whether that person thinksmuch about the matter or tells anyone else. (Similarly,aperson can be atheist without ever visitingahouse of worship to pronounce ac reed.) In aw ay,b eing an atheisti sn othing personal despite being intensely personal -it isn'tultimatelyabout who aperson takes themselvestobe, or about what sorto fp erson others expecty ou to be. Sociology'st heorists who narrow atheismd own to classifications able to sort people by anti-religious signs, such as "Ih avel ost my faith,"" There'sn og od," or "Is tand with atheism," are not learning much about atheists in general. Religion'sd efenders ofteng o further,narrowingatheists to onlypeople standingout of the crowdasanti-theists and anti-religion secularists. Sociology, by contrast,can be neutral on identity.S ociologists have every right to seek and find people fitting pre-set social identities, if that proves methodologicallyuseful. However,pointingtoadmitted identitiesorsocial identitiesasifpersonal identities have been revealed, or viceversa,i sn ever methodologicallys ound.
Defendingr eligion by taking advantage of lax psychologyo rs ociologyi s nothing new,a nd neither is the need to point out fallacious reasoning in academia. The "psychologist'sf allacy," as William James noted when psychology was emerging as ascientificfield (James1890,I,196) , occurs when the psychologistexpects the analyzedm atters described by theorizing to be prominent in a subject'sown naive experiencing.The matters important and meaningful for refined theory are often insignificant and meaningless for coarse experience, and those matters mayn ot even occur within anys ubject'se xperience.Correspondingly,a mong manyf allacies from sociology, ap articular "sociologist'sf allacy" occurs whenever the sociologist expects that the social categories applicable to people, while confirmed by sound social theorizing, must alsoc haracterize how thosep eople experience theiri mmersion in the social environs around them.
The psychologist'sfallacy is committed when the researcher presumes that a person intuitively and self-consciouslyappreciates the matters of the mental life just as described by psychological theory.Thisf allacy worsens when that psychologist further expects thataperson'st hought processes relyo nt hose theorized matters while reachingj udgments and making decisions. The fallacy is exposed when it must be deniedt hatp sychological characterizations determine the entities of one'ss elf-consciousness.T he sociologist'sf allacyi sc ommitted when the researcher presumes that aperson automaticallyand habituallyappreciates matters about the social life just as described by sociological theory.That fallacy worsens when that sociologist further expects that people'sj udgments and actions rely on those theorized matters while conducting their social life. The fallacy is exposedwhen it must be denied that social categorizations determine the identity of one'sself-conception. Aperson will not necessarilyconceive of themselvesi nt he terms imposed by psychological or sociological theorizing. They can be persuadedtodoso, in some cases, but that hardlyshows thatthey wered oing so all along.
Consider this analogy. Vegetarian eating could surelyb ed one in aw orld wheren oo ne eats meat,d espite the fact thatn oo ne in thatw orld would keep calling it "vegetarianism," and the fact thatinour world there are self-professed vegetarians sitting next to meat-eaters. We should not fixate on ad efinition of "vegetarian" as "the eating of thingst hata re not meat." Surely "vegeta-rian" can be categoricallyd efined in its ownr ight as "av egetable diet," since vegetables can exist regardlesso fw hether meat also exists, eating vegetation can be done withoutthinking about animals, and people can be vegetarian eaters without thinkinga bout their meatless condition. Thew ay that the popular notion of "vegetarian" immediatelya nd primarilys uggests "not eating meat" to manym inds simply reveals how meat-eating is taken for normality in many cultures.
Similarly,t he wayt hat "secular" suggests "defying religion" or "disdaining religion" onlyt ells us about what is still taken for normality in our culture. An assigned self identity or social identity within the context of as ingle society is not automaticallyavalid categorical identity for universal application. There are legitimatelys cientific social categoriesa nd corresponding social facts that are irreducible to social identities or self-categories, just as the reverse is true. What mayc haracterize so-called "irreligious" people in Christendom duringr ecent centuries is not axiomaticallyd eterminative of all secular experience and secular identity everywhere. In sum, secularityand secularization are not limited to locales wherer eligious people are talking about them. Again, nothing religious is required to constitutes ecularity.
There is one type of secular person who self-consciouslyr ejects gods and openlydisdains religion: the secularist.Later sections explorethe identity of secularistsand their social agendas. However,the classification for "secular person" in general can be acategorical identity,and unrelated to religion, if the "secular" is correctlyd efined.
4T he Secular
The OxfordE nglishD ictionary first lists this primary meaningf or "secular":
Of or belongingtothe present or visible world as distinguished fromthe eternal or spiritual world; temporal, worldly.
The OED,like earlier dictionaries goingbacktothe seventeenth century,assigns the meaning of "secular" through twoconcepts: the temporal and worldly. Both "temporal" and "worldly" are terms definable withoutr eferencet oa nything religious. Therefore, etymologicallyand logically, the "secular" is properlydefined without reference to anything concerning religion. That "secular" can make sense as at erminological (not logical) contraryo ft he "religious" is simply due to the fact thatr eligions usuallyd escribe their sacred and divinem atters as other-worldly, eternal, and the like. In countries long dominated by Christian-ity,thatterminological convenience within European culturehas been hypostatized into an ontological constraint,a si ft he "secular" must depend on religion everywhere. In fact,thinking about the ontology of religious matters depends on the ontology of this ordinary world, and not the other waya round (Atran 2002, chap. 4) .
What is the secular?T he secular is the temporala nd worldly, spanning the breadth of our travels and the course of our lifetimes. Takentoits broadest imaginable extent,the secular coincides with the natural, another concept definable without anyr eference to religion. Religion must define itself in conceptsb orrowed from the secular and natural realm in order to form ideas pointingbeyond temporalorworldlymatters,but nothing in the secular realm must concern itself with religiosity.That includes people. People can live secular liveswithout thinking about anything religious or nonreligious, or doing anything religious or nonreligious. "Secular" doesn'te ssentiallym ean "non-religious" anym ore than "athletic" essentiallym eans "non-sedentary." To be athletic implies being non-sedentary,but people do not consider themselvesasathletic simply because they happen to not be sedentary.
To be fullysecular,all one has to minimallydoistolead an entirelyworldly and temporall ife. One needn'te verh avet he thought, "My opinions and values are not religious" or "My daily experiences have nothing religious about them," or "My life'sactivities and associations are so worldlyand temporalcompared to religious living." Imputing such thoughts to secular people, in order to assuredly classifyt heir secularityi ns ome minimallyr eligious terms,h as no academic legitimacy.Committing the psychologist'sfallacy or the sociologist'sfallacy can be avoided.
Taking particular interest in secularity would be an expectedfeature of religion, of course. To satisfy thatreligious concern, inquisitors classifynonreligiosity into various types of deviances from religiosity or measured distances from religious matters.B ut secular people have their own concerns, not involving religion. In societies whereareligion wields enough power to impact secular people'sl ives, secular people respond by defending their priorities. To the extent that they succeed, "secularization" mayb es aid to be occurringt here, and secular people who take actiont or esist religious influences and coercions may be labeled as "secularists." All the same, the liveso fs ecular people needn'tdepend on secularization. Secular people can exist wheren os ecularization is ongoing,and they can live wherenosecularization has happened. To imagine otherwise is to dream of amythical time when all humanity was uniformlyreligious.
It is the case that identifying the "atheist" and categorizing typeso fu nbelievers as they are understood nowadays should take into account contemporary secularity'scontext within the wider field of civic engagementsoccurringwithin society.D emographic research abandoned biased and essentialist views of "atheist" inheritedf rom religion to discover much variety within that classification. Logically, not having belief in ag od encompasses both the rendering of judgment against gods and the withholding of belief about gods, as well as the absenceo fa ny thought about gods. Psychologically, the condition of blank indifferencefeels very different from thoughtful doubt or conclusive denial. That is whyathird sub-category,the "apatheist," has come to light among the Nones (noted by Marty 2003 and analyzed in Shook 2010) . Apatheism serves as the "None of the above" category after religious and nonreligious identities are abandoned. The apatheist givess ol ittle thoughtt or eligion that the label of agnostic or skeptic bestows too much creditf or contemplating the matter.B yd eclining to accept anyi dentity label for unbelief (atheist,a gnostic, etc.) as well as belief (Protestant,Catholic, etc.) , and having little to no interest in opinions about religion or God, apatheists end up as the "Nones of the Nones."
Polysecularity,e veni fi ts diversity is sorted in relation to religion, stretches very broadlyf rom atheist activistst os piritual-minded seekers.J ust as ampling illustrates this point:
Atheists heartilyexpecting thatreligion'sdisappearance would benefit humanity. Does this list illustrate how secularity requires reference to religion?Q uite the opposite: all that is required are the affirmative reasons people happen to have for occupyingt heir secular stances.T hey don'te venh avet or ealize how they occupy those positions. Religions can measure the distance of thosestances from orthodoxy,b ut secular people needn'tm ind, or care. Remember our vegetarians -the existenceo fm eat-eating isn'tr esponsible for the existenceo fv egetarians. The existenceo fs ecular people is not necessarilyt he responsibility of anyr eligions.
This point needs to be repeated. It is not religion which must establish the possibilityofs ecular nonbelief and atheism. Affirmativeg rounds -such as reason, morality,and justice -supplyample reasons for adopting alternativestoreligiosity.T heologians, it is true, have perpetuallyc laimedt hat those grounds came from, or at least depend on, the divine. They have also proposed that unbelief is due to depraved irrationality,deception by pure evil, willful loveofsin, or anarchical rebellion. Setting aside magical thinking about impiety'sbases and causes, explaining secular unbelief should be grounded in research attending to secular people'so wn beliefs and life courses.Why do they find secular ways of thinking and living mores atisfying than religious ways?W hy have some never shown anyi nterest in religious matters?W hy are manyl eaving religious paths to travel other lifestyle paths?F or those still engagingw ith religious matters in their thoughts,b yw hat criteria do they pass judgment upon religion?F or those choosing to engagereligiosity in society,what civic goals do they try to accomplish?
5P olysecularism
The macrocosm scale of group-level engagementsinvolving secularity,often visible in the form of social controversies and political struggles, have been highlighted by prominent scholars for over two decades (Casanova 1994; B hargava 1998; A sad 2003; T aylor 2009) . Their robust research demonstratesh ow to be sensitivet ot he impressive variety of religious-secular stances taken by citizens in manydifferent countries. Bhargava's(2014,330) attention to individual scales as well as social scales has become even more pronounced. Although "secularism" is usually used in onlyits political sense, it nevertheless can cover multiple dimensions. He writes, Ib egin by distinguishingt hree senses of the term "secularism." First,itisused as ashorthand for secular humanism. The second specifiest he ideals,e venu ltimatei deals,w hich give meaninga nd worth to life and that its followers strive to realize in their life, Ic all it ethical secularism.Idistinguish this ethic from political secularism.Here it stands for acertain kind of polity in which organized religious powerorreligious institutions are separated from organized political power or political institutionsf or specific ends.
Secularism remains more useful for Bhargava primarilyasasocial and political phenomena, rather than as af eature of social processes emerging from secular individuals and their perspectives.
This top-down approach has been typical across much of secular studies, as it was inheritedf rom sociological studies of religion. Monika Wohlrab-Sahr,a s another example, has discerned correlations between personal,s ocial,a nd civic-minded secularisms. Since no single pattern to such correlations could be expected across societies, one can at best speak of "multiple secularities," as she has done (2012). One kind of secularityfound in one country maybalance ac ertain distribution of religious and nonreligious people with givena rrangements of civic power allotted to religions and the government. Other countries, depending on their particular developmenta sanation, have settled into quite different distributions and arrangements (and these patterns are dynamic over time as well). Like Bhargava, Wohlrab-Sahr ascribes secularity principallytocollectivessuch as societies and nations, rather thantoindividuals.Classifying citizens and their concerns is subsequent upon categorizations for social arrangements and dynamics.
Although individuals hardly exist apart from theirsocial roles and functions, and citizens surely have their political duties and powers,transposing socio-political classifications upon the individual level is methodologicallyh azardous. Such transposition can seem justifiable. Whatever is studied at the personal level should be correlatable, in some manner,w ith important features at group, social,a nd national levels. Even large-scale processes of secularization or re-sacralization concern how manyp eople are managingt heir social and civic relationships and thinking about theiro wn stances.B ut thosep eople are not involved in anyuniformorpredictable way. Secular people do not have identical attitudes towards religion, they do not have the same priorities for opposing religion, and they willn ot usually agree about effective strategies against religion. Af allacy lurks in an expectation that people themselvesa re well-categorized for all purposes through the broad social categories for processes ongoing in their locality.The reliable exception is the secularist.
Secularism is primarily about effortstodiminish religious control over social structures and publicthinking.There is no uniformorunified waythat secularity manifests itself as ap ublic agenda. There are manya gendas of secularism, depending on the type of religious control to be monitored and challenged. Forexample,p olitical secularism seeks adjustments to the relative control of religion and government over each other.T here are multiple secular agendas, and manyt ypeso fa ctivists supporting one or another of those agendas, that do not necessarilyc ooperate or even cohere. That absenceo fu nity,a nd readyc apacity for fractiousness, calls for the recognition of "polysecularism."
The evident fact that no two countries arrangepolitical stabilities in religionstate relations in the samem anner points to multi-secularity,a sw eo bserved. The less-noticed fact that secularist agendas within acountry have distinct ideals and goals, and mayn ot care for consensus among them, points to polysecularism. Polysecularism in turn drawsa ttention to the diversity of roles for the prosecularism citizen, the secularist.S ecularistsc an have allies. Participation in a particulars ecularism agenda, such as political secularism, is by no means limited to nonbelievers. Ar eligious citizen who supports public education over parochial education or supports separation of church and state should not be la-beled as asecularist without strict qualifications. Nonreligious citizens(atheists, in the basic sense) who advocate for some secularism agenda(s)c an accurately be classed as secularists.
Core agendas of secularism, and secularist supporters of those agendas, typicallyalign with one or more of these activities: (a) endorsing the reasonableness of personal secularityb yc ontesting religious claims about unnatural/transcendent divinitiesa nd values;( b) groundingm oralityw ith ethical systems consistent with secular personal living and human welfare; and (c) justifying frees ocieties having political systems promotingindividual liberties and civic progress. It is no coincidencethat these threesecular agendas lookfamiliar to intellectual historians recountingmajor kinds of popularfreethought and secular thinking in western civilization (Putnam 1894; L arue1 996) . Nor is it ac oincidencet hat demographers tracking secularist attitudes in populations can also detect that familiar pattern.
The demographic studyofasocial phenomenon like religiosity,orsecularity, can identify three primary features of an individual'so utlook: one'sb elief, behavior,and belonging. These features are organicallyinterfused, so an isolation of one factor is at most auseful abstraction (Day2011), but they can suggest correlations with other social features and culturalfactors. Polysecularism displays three general modes -based on belief, behavior,a nd belonging -concerning one'sworldview,one'ssocial ethos, and one'scivic participation. As bothscholars of intellectual history and social movements have noted, irreligion and antitheism are frequentlymotivated by objectionstoreligiosity'sreliance on faith, or to ar eligion'se thical lapses, or to religion'sd etrimental effects on societies. Three primary agendas of secularism manifest at the individual level in the secularist;t hree idealizedt ypes are hencea vailable for "the secularist": (a) The secularist is the anti-theistic and anti-metaphysical thinker denying religious dogmas. (b)T he secularist is the anti-religious moralist accusingr eligion and religious people of ethical failings. (c) The secularist is the anti-clerical activist demanding that denominations renounce governing power.
Idealized manifestations of "the secularist" can also be phrased in terms of positive agendas and loyalties: (d) The secularist is astaunchadvocate of reason and science, over superstition and religious faith. (e) The secularist is adedicated subscriber to asecular ethics, placing humanity first instead of ag od.
(f)T he secularist is an equalc itizen of as ecular polity,k eepingo ther group memberships subordinate.
Where religion exercises cultural dominance,t he secularist can stand out as a radical freethinker,awise sage, or ad angerous agitator.I nacountry already fairlys ecularized in manyw ays, such as the United States,s ecularists would not stand out so prominently, but they do attempt to sustain momentum inherited from past secularist efforts. Polysecularity is one kind of phenomenon, while polysecularism is quite another.Onlyaminorityofsecular people ever become secularists and participate in one or another of secularism'sa gendas. That fact is often overlooked or misinterpreted, even in otherwise reliable histories of freethoughta nd secularism. All too often, one feature of secularism is taken to characterize all of secularity, or to define the essence of atheism. Models designed to explain group behavior or make crowd action understandable seek out characteristic social identities, but they don'tn ecessarilyc haracterize all concerned. Social histories focusing on asingle erawilldiscern how one or another type of secularist then holds center stage, but extrapolatingt hat starring role across other eras or cultures is unwise. The next sections describe how these threep rimary agendas (along with manysecondary agendas) are capable of being equallypotent; they are not necessarilya llies, and they don'te asilyb lend together or even cooperate in alignment with each other.Antagonisms are certainlypossible, and probablyinevitable, as the next section explores.
6P olysecularity and Polysecularism Today
Toom uch research conducted on secularity has tended to assign nonbelievers into "atheism" for their group identity, and jointlya ssumedt hats ecularist activism is characteristic of atheism, since activism is an obvious place to acquire observations of atheists. Such presumptions have allowed much research to expect manyo rm ost nonbelievers to share ac ommon psychological profile, despite the wayt hat common perceptions of atheism do not essentialize atheists to ah ighd egree (Toosi and Ambady2 011). Trying to explain "the atheist," and what atheists are all doing,w orks betterw ith ap re-prepared essentialization for atheism, of course. Previous sections of this chapter have raised worries about that essentialization. It is not an unreasonable concern that religious bias against atheists has been predisposing psychological researchto"discover" negative personality traits in atheists in order to fit "evolution of religion" narrativesc omposed to normalize religiosity across humanity. Disordered brains would bring disorder to society,a fter all. Depicting unbelievers as readyp articipants for disrupting civil stability with unrulysecularist activismhas long been as tereotype perpetuated by religion.
What do secular people actuallytake themselvest obethinking,and doing? Much data can be gathered from open and self-identified atheists alreadyattending atheist, skeptic, humanist,o rf reethought groups,o rp articipating in online forums sharing those interests (Cimino and Smith 2007; P asquale 2010; S mith 2010; B aker and Robbins 2012; Williamson and Yancey 2013) . Recently, Christopher Silvera nd Thomas Coleman (2014) led ar esearch team investigatinga n even broader spectrum, looking for motivations and priorities of nonbelievers who mostly do not affiliate or participate with anygroup of like-minded nonbelievers. Their research findingsallowed them to distinguish six main types of secular people, lending additional empirical support to the sketches of polysecularity and polysecularism in this chapter.These six typesdonot deviate much from prior understandingso ft he nonreligious gained by demographers (Kosmin et al. 2009 ), and they don'tappear to divergegreatlyfrom other recent hypotheses for arranginga spects and scales to secular/atheist identities (Cragun, Hammer, and Nielsen 2015; Schnell 2015; Vainio and Visala 2015) . These six typesare also easilyrecognizable to secular leaders (such as myself)who are experienced with grassroots recruitinga mong nonbelievers.
Earlier sections of this chapter highlight threem ain distinctions within polysecularity (skeptical, agnostic, and apathetic) and threemain modes to polysecularism (intellectual, moral, and civic). Interestingly,Silverand Coleman'sclassification of six types of nonreligious people easilyf it six of the boxesi na3x3 table resulting from crossingp olysecularity with polysecularism. Abrief overviewofthese six types, quoting from descriptions by Silverand Coleman (2014, 993 -996) , shows how to situate them. Intellectual Atheist/Agnostic (IAA). "IAA typologyi ncludes individuals who proactivelyseek to educatethemselvesthrough intellectual association, and pro-actively acquireknowledge on various topics relating to ontology (the search for Truth) and non-belief. … IAAs associate with fellow intellectuals regardless of their ontological position as long as the IAA associate is versed and educated on various issues of science, philosophy, rational theology, and common socio-political religious dialogue." These secular people are open about theirunbelief and irreligious dissent on intellectual grounds,a nd they like to associate with others on thoseb ases. The IAA type lies at the congruence of apro-reason motivation and skeptical atheism.
Anti-Theist (AT). "[A]ntitheists view religion as ignorance … they view the logical fallacies of religion as an outdated worldview that is not onlydetrimental to social cohesion and peace, but alsot otechnological advancement and civilised evolution as aw hole. They are compelled to share their view and want to educateothers … SomeAnti-Theistindividuals feel compelled to work against the institution of religion in its various forms including social,p olitical, and ideological, while others maya ssert their view with religious persons on an individual basis." Anti-theists are primarilyd issenters against religion in society, more than against godi nh eaven; the anti-theist type is ardentlya ntagonistic against what religion stands for in society and what religious people do. The distinctionb etween IAA and AT types is familiar to sociologists as something akin to the divide between HighC hurch (intellectual) and Low Church (emotional) sides to an ideological movement or religious denomination. The AT type exemplifies combiningt he skepticallya theist stance with the civic and political secular agenda to limit religion'si nfluencei ns ociety.
Activist Atheist/Agnostic (AAA). "[T]hey seek to be both vocal and proactive regardingcurrent issuesinthe atheist/agnostic socio-political sphere. This sociopolitical sphere can include such egalitarian issues, but is not limited to concerns of humanism, feminism, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgenderissues, social or political concerns, human rights themes, environmental concerns,animal rights, and controversies such as the separation of church and state." The AAA type often seeks alliances with other movements, prioritizingp ositive civica nd political agenda(s) without worryingmuch about labelingas"atheist" or "agnostic." In the grassroots arena, this type tends to prefer non-confrontation with religion, and often seeks "inter-faith" work with religious groups on shared civic goals. The AAAt ype results from combiningt he tolerantlya gnostic attitude with civic secular agendas.
Ritual Atheist/Agnostic (RAA). "TheR AA holds no belief in God or the divine, or they tend to believei ti su nlikelyt hat there is an afterlife with God or the divine. … [T]hey mayfind utility in the teachings of some religious traditions. They see these as more or less philosophical teachingso fh ow to live life and achieveh appiness rather than ap ath to transcendental liberation. Ritual Athe-ist/Agnostics find utilityintradition and ritual." This type perpetuates traditions of religious or "spiritual" humanism or religious naturalism, and manyc ongregatew ith Unitarian Universalist churches or Ethical Culture societies, or other sorts of humanist communities.T hey are often intellectual, and they endorse worthyc ivic and political causes, but they typicallyp ut more of their energies into local communal activities rather thana ntagonism against religion. The RAA type connects the agnostic attitude with the secular priority of living an ethical life.
The last twoc ategories are for people who aren't "secularists" in the strict sense of participatingi nt he advocacy of secularization, although they do contribute to the overall secularityi nasociety.
Seeker-Agnostic (SA). " [R] ecognizes the philosophical difficulties and complexities in making personal affirmationsr egardingi deological beliefs… simply cannot be sure of the existenceofGod or the divine. They keep an open mind in relation to the debate between the religious,s piritual, and antitheist elements within society." These seekers often turn up in polling as "transient" Nones; they mayb ea ttending churches (irregularly)b ecause they care about finding ar easonable fit with their flexible worldview(s). Affirming atheists can disapproveo ft he SA type for appreciating too manyp erspectives, but the SA type won'tp ut all their faith in as ingle confiningw orldview,e vens cience's. This type of nonreligious person represents the combination of an agnostic attitude with search for ar easonable lifestance.
The last category is the Non-Theist(NT). "Forthe Non-Theists, the alignment of oneself with religion, or converselya ne pistemological position against religion, can appearq uite unconventional from their perspective.H owever,afew terms mayb est capturet he sentimentso ft he Non-Theist.O ne is apathetic, while another mayb ed isinterested. The Non-Theisti sn onactive in terms of involving themselvesi nsocial or intellectual pursuitsh aving to do with religion or anti-religion." These individuals are prototypical apatheists, avoiding cognitive or culturaltensions about being nonreligious. They aren'tanything like nonconformists or anarchists -that would requiret oo much effort -as they participate in lifestyles they judge best.
This sortofc lassification for typeso fs ecular people onlysuperficiallyclassifies people by their evident priorities, as they explain thosep riorities themselvesi nsofar as they are nonreligious. This classification cannot and does not mean to imply, for example, that IAA types aren'te thical or don'tc are about the civic life. An IAA or AT (etc.) maybeahighlyenergetic promoter for asecular cause or give generouslyt ot he Red Cross or the United Way. This sort of classification is about how people connect their nonreligious attitude with their secular views and preferred activities.
There are at otal of nine possible combinations. Three boxess tand empty onlys of ar as Silvera nd Coleman'si nitial presentation of theirr esearch is concerned. There probablya re nonreligious people in theird ata better fitting into these three boxes. The top middle boxi sf or people too anti-religious to enjoy congregating,w hile preferrings ome sort of "lifestyle humanism" expressing their personal principles, so they affirmhumanist ideals without communal validation. The lower left boxi sf or people too apathetic to have an opinion about religion so they aren'tusing logic to argueagainst it,yet they feel stronglydevoted to advancingcritical thinking and rational analysis,s ow ecan label them as "rationalists." The lower right boxi sf or people apathetic about bothr eligion and ethical ideas. They aren'tp rotesting against religion using government, but they do support ac ivil order guaranteeings tability and liberty for everyone regardlessofreligiosity,sothey can be called "republicans." (The lower-case "republicans" advocated constitutional democracyi nt he annalso fp olitics, while "Republicans" belong to ap articularp olitical party.)
No ideal schema awaitsa tt he "end" to this kind of research, but more detailed classifications have theoretical value in conjunction with further productive investigations. An example is provided below,taking cues from polysecularity.I tp rovides ar ow for those occasionallys eeking religious inspiration, and a column for those expecting science to refutea nd replace religion. With anysuch classification, no presumption should be made that an individual fits onlyasingle classification, thinks of one'sself as fitting acategory,orunderstands that category'si ntellectual history. Agnostics who appreciates cience can be comfortable with truces sounding like NOMA: science and religion are "non-overlappingmagisteria" that yield different yetv alid knowledge.( " Religion knows what happens after death, some-thing science could never refute.")B yc ontrast, staunch skeptics relying on science demand non-negotiable confrontations with religion over the truth. Those apathetic about religion can drift into optional stances.Logic-lovers will find rationalism'sneutralityquite sensible(lending appeal to stoicism), while admirers of science will expect it to admit that plentyofreligious views getscientificconfirmations ("It looks like evolution works best when God causesmutations.")Prioritizing civic order findsagnostics advocating,with Thomas Jefferson, acivil republic that stays strictlyn eutral about religion.
Lookinga cross the bottom row, seekers have several options. Fews eekers know anything about Plato, for example, but seekers expecting logic to identify god(or be god) would head towards adualistic metaphysics like Platonism. Scientific-minded seekers will expect as ynthesis of divine guidance with nature's laws, so some sort of syncretic worldview (Deismo rT heosophy, for example) can appeal to them. Seekers prioritizinge thics gravitate towards eclectic religious or quasi-religious communities.S eekers prioritizing civic order may judge,asJames Madison did, that aprovidential godfavors agod-fearingrepublic over decadent aristocracies.
7O rganized Polysecularism
Organizations advancingt he interests of secular people can be classified using these sorts of frameworks,b ecause public support rests on thosea ble to play the role of as ecularist through their attendancea te vents and financial giving. Like individuals,organizations mayormay not neatlyfit asingle box. However, few attempt to equallyrepresent manyboxes, because of the inherent discrepancies and disagreements among them, as the theory of polysecularism explains. This theory also can account for the kinds of disagreements, and even antagonisms, between secular organizations, and the fragile nature of alliances.
Researchinto secular movements and organizations has acceleratedrecently (Smith 2013; C imino and Smith 2014; Langston, Hammer,a nd Cragun 2015 ;L eDrew 2015b). Seculariststrying to find or re-shape their identitiesare participating in dynamic and growingo rganizations from neighborhood-to nation-level sizes, which are simultaneouslym olding their messages to attract participants. The typical type of organization at the local level is the "single-issue" secular group, so that even asmall city has pro-science,atheist, and humanist meetups (see Schutz this volume). Largero rganizations take a "small-cluster" approach covering af ew neighboring boxes, such as AmericanA theists at IAA/CON/AT, or the AmericanA ssociation for the Advancement of Science at NOMA/ACC. Some national-level organizations are "horizontally-integrated" to represent an entire row -the Center for Inquiry,for example, from IAA to AT.Very few organizations would or could attempt avertically-integrated approach -the American Humanist Association is the closest example by clustering at HUM/RAA/AAA (for more on these national groups,s ee Fazzino and Cragun, this volume).
Deep fault-lines between manyofthe boxesare sufficient to prevent anysingle secular organization from growinginto alarge cluster,and oftenobstruct alliances among secular organizations.
First,p romotingahumanist ethics about equalitya nd rights agreeable to people of all faiths can be deeplyu psetting to anti-theists unwilling to set aside objectionst of aith just for the sake of social harmony.T he anti-theism agenda can sound out of tune with the humanist ethics agenda, because humanism is unwilling to denigrate or demonize religious believers for their "foolish" faiths. Promoting ah umanist ethics about equalitya nd rights agreeable to all peoples can collide with anti-theism'st ypical degree of intolerance towards religious believers. Anti-theists won'ts ee anything ethical at all about faith, despite humanism'se ffortst ou nderstand religion as something quite human, and anti-theismwon'taward anyrights to religion justfor the sake of social harmony.
Second, the anti-theism agenda doesn'tharmonizewell with the secular polity agenda. Prioritizing open attacks against the reasonableness or even sanity of religious believers will alienate the believers who do agree on separation of church and state.Religious believers couldn'treallybeblamed for losing interest in apolitical alliance with anti-theists to reduce denominational control in government.F or their part,advocates of asecular politycan tolerate non-theocratic religions as legitimate social organizations promotingt he good life for their members, but anti-theismr efuses to recognize churches as trulyh ealthyf or their congregants.
Third, the anti-clerical agenda can sideline the humanist ethics agenda. Prioritizing the establishment of as ecular government on value-neutral principles, as liberalism proposes,demotes secular ethics to privatevalues instead of potent political ideals. Humanist ethics are demoted from au niversal framework of principled ideals down to just another lifestyle choice for people who happen to be secular.H umanism once upon at ime positioned itself as the supreme arbiter of human rights and democratic values. It gave birth to liberalism, which went on to disavowi ts heritagew hile searchingf or non-ethical foundations to political rights and institutions. Liberalism,for its part,has stakedits legitimacy on lacking anypartiality towardsone or another competingviewofthe good life or ac omprehensive conception of "the good." That excludes anyf avoritism or relianceo nh umanism, so humanism is reduced to the samec ivic status held by every religion, and loses its distinctiveness alongsidet hat company.
Polysecularity is the demographic backdrop to the culturala nd political stagew herep olysecularism is enacted in multiple agendas and secularists choose their preferred roles.P olysecularity forbids anys implistic reduction of secularityt os omething uniform and predictable. Homogeneity and consistency will not be found anywhere. Whether secular organizations like it or not,t he three main secular agendas are difficult to pursue simultaneously, and in fact they usually tend to frustrate and obstruct each other.A st he second table reveals, more nuanced discriminations among secular viewpointsa nd secularist positions onlye xpose additional fault-lines.
The course of "New Atheism" also illustratesb oth polysecularism and its challenges. Self-identified new atheists don'ts ound like humanists L eDrew 2015a) , but their distinctive tone conveyeds ubstantive agendas (Kettell 2013; K ettell 2014) . Fewo rganizations seemed readyf or those agendas. Secular organizations that re-arranged priorities after the rise of New Atheism in the mid-2000s, for example, promptlygenerated external scrutinyand internal challenges. Wast he energy of New Atheism about science confronting religion's illusions (CON), or was it more about shamingreligion for its social conservatism and complicity in rights violations (AT)? Perhaps both, but it causedo rganizational strain to divert resourcestobothsimultaneously. (Full disclosure: this author was astaff member of twomajor secular organizations duringthe height of New Atheism.) Fortheir part,humanists didn'tsee how those controversies helped deconvert religious people through values, while agnostics didn'tsee science disprovingG od or the Bible, so New Atheism left both typesw ondering how much they reallyh ad in common with aggressive atheists. As for New Atheism, it quicklyidentified traitors -NOMA, ACC, and AAA -while dismissing humanist communities as too "religious" ("They are still singingtogether?!"). Mobilizations in defense of AAAp riorities (such as "Atheism+" and "The Orbit" initiatives) distanced themselvesf rom New Atheism. The secular organizations focused on church-state separation clustered with AAA/SEC and tendedt o avoid New Atheism bombast,while largerorganizations mimicking New Atheism rhetoric found fewer allies among religious organizations alsodefending churchstate separation.
In the meantime,v ast constituencies are still getting overlooked. Seekers comprise al arge majority of the Nones. Types of seekers such as SYNa nd CON want toleration and church-states eparation. They could supplyv ast ideological and financial support to coresecular agendas, but they have been mostly ignored.
